We show that professional management began to emerge in UK companies during the first half of the twentieth century, a development which was widely theorised and accepted. However, the managerially-led enterprise was accommodated rather than protected by company law, making it vulnerable to changes in the law. The Cohen Report of 1945 paid no attention to these developments, and led to the introduction, in the Companies Act 1948, of important, but previously little appreciated, changes in the name of enhancing the T he directors by simple majority overturned existing structures overnight and was an important driver of the hostile takeover, which emerged shortly afterwards. This deprived management of the necessary autonomy to balance the competing interests at stake in the enterprise and to foster innovation. The emergence of the current system of shareholder primacy can be traced back to these developments.
INTRODUCTION
H the statesman. The human association which in fact produces and distributes wealth, the association of workmen, managers, technicians and directors, is not an association recognised by the law. The association which the law does recognise the association of shareholders, creditors and directors is incapable of production or distribution and is not expected by the law to perform these functions. We have to give law to the real association and to withdraw meaningless privilege from the 2 In this article we offer a new account of the implications of the Companies Act 1948 for corporate governance in the UK, focusing on its effects on the autonomy that professional managers had gained during the first half of the twentieth century, and claimed to be using to balance the competing claims of the various contributors to the corporate enterprise. This autonomy was accommodated but not explicitly protected by the law. We argue that the introduction of a mandatory power for shareholders to remove directors by simple majority in the Companies Act 1948 was an important driver of the emergence of the hostile takeover, which is characterised by wholesale replacement of directors. This allowed the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance to become established and supersede the emergent managerially-led enterprise that had evolved after 1900. In doing so, we show that, rather than a pure market outcome, shareholder control over companies was a policy choice imposed by legislation, which professional management and the enterprise.
The article draws on a historically-grounded account of the function of management, as well as archival research on the genesis of the Cohen Report that led to the Companies Act 1948, to make two contributions. First, it contributes to the theoretical debate about the role of company law in shaping corporate governance outcomes. We show that the 1948 reforms were a regulatory intervention which disrupted the pre-1948 governance arrangements in which directors (and, below them, managers) were strongly entrenched and to which shareholders had consented. Our analysis provides support for those who contend that constitution of financial property forms such as 3 However, it goes further and shows that rights by rewriting the bargains struck between shareholders and companies. In doing so,
, in which the state substitutes its view of a desirable corporate governance framework for the outcome of -driven, market-4 As such, it is closer to the fears expressed by -motivated regulatory interventions that will inevitably reflect the partisan preferences of dominant social interest importance of the emergence of institutional investors in the post-war period. We add to this debate by arguing that the contribution of the shareholder removal power to the hostile takeover has not, to date, been adequately explored. The new powers given to shareholders made control of many companies suddenly contestable, as the threshold for director removal was reduced overnight to a simple majority. The effect was to transform managerial practices, sidelining the dominant managerial ideology of balancing competing interests, and ultimately acting as one of the key drivers of the emergence of financialised corporate governance and the social norm of shareholder primacy. 6 Scholars have identified many of the costs of this shift, such as its impact on employee willingness to make contractually unprotected investments in firm-specific human capital, and reduced investment in R&D. 7 This paper suggests that these effects were, in considerable part, driven by the legal changes of 1948 and the subsequent emergence of the hostile takeover, which disrupted the management-led enterprises that had developed during the first half of the twentieth century.
The paper is structured as follows. In Part 2, we explore the historical emergence of modern professional management in the UK from the end of the nineteenth century. While the UK may have lagged behind the US and Germany in this regard, we show that this development was widely accepted, and was legitimated on the grounds that these scientific managers would seek to innovate and to balance the competing interests at stake in the enterprise. In part 3, we show that these radical changes in the management of companies occurred in an unchanged legal context and that the law never developed a positive conception of the role of management. Various familiar features of company law allowed the development of relatively autonomous hierarchies which could operate in this way, but the law did not provide positive support for them, refusing, for example, to allow boards of directors to give managers 6 show that the company law reforms of 1947-8 represent a deliberate regulatory intervention into the control of companies which sought to put shareholders in control. The reformers ignored the emerging role of management within the enterprise and focused exclusively on the relationship between shareowners and directors. We examine in particular the origins of, majority. Part 5 shows how these reforms contributed to creating the conditions for the emergence of the hostile takeover, characterised by the removal of directors and a reorientation of managerial objectives, from the 1950s onwards. We conclude with a plea for scholars to address the role and status of management in law, which is essential if post-crisis economies are to become sustainable and responsible.
THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT IN THE UK
The timing of the separation of ownership and control in the UK remains controversial. The conventional account, based on Chandler, is that family control of companies persisted in the UK during the first half of the twentieth century. 8 Hannah has challenged this, arguing on the basis of London Stock Exchange data that the separation occurred much earlier in listed companies, so that, by the early twentieth century, a substantial majority of large quoted British industrials had widely dispersed shareholdings, but with the directors (and other founders) owning up to 33% of the shares. within the firm, and often exploits firm-specific knowledge emerging from the production 19 Accordingly, UK management clearly lagged behind their counterparts in other jurisdictions in fostering innovation through research and innovation programmes, 20 with some scholars explaining this on the basis that British boards did not delegate enough authority to their managers. 21 We will see in section 3 below that the law imposed limitations on the extent to which directors could do this.
The professional manager was a new figure on the industrial scene, and his role had to be explained and legitimated. This process began in the UK around the turn of the twentieth century in the management literature, 22 which explained that professional managers furthered the public good by applying specialised skills, following an ethics of professionalism which required them to balance competing interests, and fostering the development of innovative capabilities. In the past management has often been somewhat mechanical in its tendency, ignoring the human element in production and distribution. Today, more than ever, it is realised that the welfare of the worker is not only a vital matter for the community, but also from the point of view of the employer a matter of expediency. These developments in managerial theory and practice occurred after the establishment of the legal framework governing the allocation of power in companies. In this section, we show that the growth of professional management was accommodated within existing and developing company law doctrines and practices, rather than positively supported by law. As company law gave considerable leeway to directors and prevented shareholders from interfering directly in business decisions, boards were able to shield professional managers from shareholder pressure, giving them sufficient autonomy to balance competing interests and to innovate. However, the law paid no attention to management, recognising the position but ignoring managers below board level. This meant that managerial autonomy was never guaranteed by law, a fragile state of affairs which was disrupted by subsequent changes to the law which empowered shareholders and contributed to the emergence of the hostile takeover (discussed in parts 4 and 5 below).
(a) The legal conditions allowing the emergence of professional management Directors were also commonly entrenched through provisions in the articles. By default, available for re-election by the general meeting by simple majority. 50 However, this offered little help to restive shareholders because, as a default rule, it was avoided in a number of ways. Some companies made no provision for removal of directors whatsoever, which meant that the shareholders had to pass a special resolution to change the articles before they could vote on removal of directors. 51 Before 1906, most companies made bespoke provision to designate one or more managing directors who were exempt from retirement by rotation.
52
In 1906, Table A was amended to reflect this practice and provided a default rule allowing companies to appoint managing directors, who were exempt from retirement by rotation, and this was rarely displaced. 53 Finally, it was a common practice for the founders of the company to provide that they would remain directors for life or for a certain number of years provided they satisfied a shareholding requirement. 54 These strategies, which were adopted by a G 55 meant that a special resolution to change the articles was required, followed by a vote to remove the director. 50 Companies Act 1862, Nor did amalgamations and mergers during the first half of the twentieth century generally result in changes to the directors and managers. 56 These operations proceeded consensually, with directors only departing by consent, and managerial hierarchies frequently remaining intact, particularly in the early, largely anti-competitive amalgamations in which individual companies remained separately managed under a holding company. 57 This was a far cry from the hostile takeovers of the second half of the twentieth century in which a bidder explicitly sought to change the incumbent directors as soon as they gained control.
These practices meant that shareholder removal of directors was, as an 1894 book aimed investors put it, 58 However, the effective entrenchment of directors and managers, with shareholders becoming increasingly peripheral, did not give rise to controversy, and was endorsed by the company law literature during this period.
59
Looking beyond removal of directors, shareholders had few other options open to them. The law did not allow them to interfere with the decisions of the directors. In a number of cases at the beginning of the twentieth century, the courts ruled that a simple majority of shareholders could not give binding instructions to the directors. These rulings were justified either by reference to the bargain made between the shareholders, 60 or to the need to protect minority shareholders, 61 or to the company as a separate legal entity. 62 It is at least arguable that, whilst the judges were justifying their decisions on the basis of conventional company law concerns, they were in fact reflecting the emerging and widely accepted ideology that, in order for businesses to be successful, management had to be free from interference.
Further support for this argument comes from the United States, which saw similar legal developments around the same time, but justified on entirely different bases. There the courts prevented shareholder interference with management on the basis that the power to manage was given to the directors by the law of the state of incorporation, 63 78 For a rare example in which a managing director with a ten year contract was ousted from his position by a holding company which had acquired all the shares in the company and altered the articles, allowing it to remove any director by notice, terminating his contract and giving him a right to damages: see Southern Foundries (1926) decisions created board autonomy, and allowed for the emergence of professional management who nomics could specialise their skills to those of the firm and make credible commitments to those they managed.
(b) The missing concept of the manager in company law
The last section shows that the autonomy of directors in relation to shareholders was established by law and practice. However, the law had less to say about professional managers, being content simply to leave them under the control of the directors, and never developing a positive conception of the managerial function. In company law, managers were simply viewed as employees, 79 with a limited duty of good faith implied into their contract of employment, 80 whilst in labour law they were treated as representatives of the employer.
81
The law allowed directors to delegate functions to managers, provided there was a power to do so in the articles, as there was by default, 82 and its scope increased over time. As discussed above, the practice evolved of the directors appointing one or more of their number as managing directors to act as the head of management, and the courts recognised the validity of these contractual arrangements. 83 director remained with him (as a fiduciary) and with the rest of the board, although the requirements of diligence on the other (non-managing) directors were not stringent. 85 The common thread running through all these changes was that the managing director or manager had to also be a director, and so a connection was maintained between the board and the management through the person of the managing director or manager. 86 another case, the court ruled that, where management was delegated to a general manager, er are those which 92 Hence there was a separation between the management function, which could be delegated by the board, and the control function, which could not. While these cases provided legal support for delegation of business decision-making and management to managers below board level, the management function was never positively defined.
By interpreting the default articles as making appointment of management a matter for the directors alone, the law created scope for the emergence of the managerially-led enterprise.
As we have seen, there was no positive conception of the role of management, and managerial autonomy was achieved indirectly, through a combination of entrenched boards, bespoke articles, and the non-interventionist approach taken by the courts. There was no significant opposition to director and management control in the legal and management literatures of the first half of the twentieth century, but equally, managerial autonomy rested on weak legal foundations. This, then, was the context in which the Cohen Committee was appointed in 1943 to conduct a review of company law.
THE COHEN COMMITTEE AND THE COMPANIES ACT 1948
Finding the shareholder a passing investor, we have insisted that he is an owner and a member of an electorate. Finding managements to be hirers of capital, we have tried to bury this disquieting fact by calling them hired hands of the shareholderowners. Finding "control" to have slid away from "ownership," we have sought to put the control back with the ownership where it "belongs." Pressed by the evident 99 The Cohen Report (1945) above n 93, para 5, stated that its proposals for information disclosure e that as much information as is reasonably required shall be made available both to the 100 ibid, paras 96 and 103. 101 ibid, para 119. This recommendation was specifically targeted at protecting shareholders, who 102 ibid, para 101. This was a particularly controversial topic, and much time was spent discussing it. 103 Ibid. 104 It did propose giving the courts power to require, and making it easier for shareholders to demand, B T
Cohen Report (1945) above n 93, para 156) However, there was no proposal to allow any group other than the shareholders to demand an investigation, and discussions about the introduction of public shareholders (see for example, Minutes of evidence (1943-44) above n 43, Appendix M at 169) or company commissioners (see for example ibid, para 8134) during the hearings made no impact on the final report.
within companies ever discussed du C and it was rarely raised in any of the memoranda that it considered. Instead, influential members of the committee simply proceeded on the a priori basis that re-establishing shareholder control over directors 134 Ibid. Ultimately s193 CA 1948 introduced a rule requiring directors to disclose to, and obtain approval from, the general meeting of office, or as consideration for or in connection w Failure to comply would result in the director holding the payment on trust for shareholders who sold their shares.
More generally, the Committee was clearly concerned that it was very difficult to remove long-term or life directors who were no longer competent, but who had entrenched themselves through provisions in the articles, either upon foundation or during an amalgamation process, 135 an area in which Cohen had practised. 136 The recommendation to make all directors removable by ordinary resolution certainly made it futile for directors to negotiate long-term seats on the board following a merger. However, the decision to give the We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this point. 
U"
153 However, like the Committee, none of these commentators appears to have anticipated the full implications of this change.
This provision, which represented a deliberate policy decision to interfere in contractual allocations of rights, transformed the balance of power within companies. It gave the majority in general meeting full control of the composition of the board for the first time, and so shifted ultimate control of the direction of the company from the board (and, often, the management) to the general meeting, which came to be viewed as the ul 154 It strengthened the position of those who argued that the board of directors was the representative of the shareholders, and weakened advocates of the real entity approach, who emphasised the company as a separate legal entity, and its long-term interests as the touchstone for good management.
155
However, its most important effect was that it contributed to the emergence of the hostile takeover, because it allowe B 156 with a considerable degree of confidence that they would be successful and certain that, having acquired control of the general meeting, they would be able to replace the directors (and with them, the senior management). onwards, the argument that management should balance competing interests at stake in the company was rarely heard, as the focus shifted to prioritising the interests of shareholders.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER IN THE 1950s
In C C first wave of hostile takeovers struck British companies. asymmetry between incumbent directors, who only had to control directly or through other supportive shareholders 25% of the shares in order to prevent a bid which would make changes of which they did not approve, and bidders, who had to acquire 75% of the shares to take control of the general meeting and change the board. As a result, consensual mergers were the norm, and hostile takeovers were virtually unheard of. Where they did occur, they were motivated by an industrial, and generally anticompetitive, logic. For example, many companies provided for the appointment of a managing director who did not have to stand for re-election by rotation, either for a fixed term or indefinitely. 165 The courts enforced articles giving broad powers to managing directors, even where this effectively gave them a veto over board decisions, and so increasing the size of the board in accordance with the articles would not have allowed a new majority controller to take control of management from a managing director without altering the articles (which would have required 75%). 166 Hence, being appointed as a managing director would allow a director to , 167 and the courts were content to allow this to happen in the name of managerial continuity. uncertainty of litigation to challenge managerial decisions taken in the interim, would have been sufficient to deter most would-be bidders. Even if banks had been willing to lend, this would, in most cases, have ruled out using borrowed money to fund the acquisition of shares.
By levelling the playing field between incumbents and outsiders, the 1948 changes radically altered the prospects of hostile takeovers, making it much more difficult for company directors to resist, and opened up a wider range of companies to hostile takeover. In the period from 1948 until the introduction of the City Code in 1968, the ability to take control of a company by obtaining a simple majority of the shares was a fundamental driver of the emergence of the hostile takeover. Whilst shareholders generally may have been dispersing, H ation to listed companies, noted above, shows that directors and other founders normally controlled around one third of the shares, with the directors themselves often controlling around 25%. 170 This, of course, was sufficient to maintain control under the default and normally adopted rules of However, there is no evidence that this mechanism was used in the UK as a pre-emptive defence against hostile takeovers. If adopted on incorporation, this would reflect the agreement between the founders (and indeed such clauses are widely understood as a means of protecting agreements within quasi-partnership companies), but it would be difficult to introduce such a clause after listing, as this would require a special resolution to alter the articles, and institutional shareholders would be strongly opposed to a measure that would entrench board members. This hostility can be seen from their opposition to the use of non-voting shares, which were used for a brief period as a defensive measure during the 1950s and 1960s, but were gradually eliminated by strong opposition from institutional investors and disapproval from the stock exchange (Franks et al (2005) above n 55, p 604). This hostility presumably explains why multiple voting rights are legally permissible but rarely seen in practice in UK listed companies ( bidder who sought to buy control on the market rather than through a private acquisition of a controlling stake. Moreover, the rapid growth in institutional investment from the 1950s onwards ensured that bidders were increasingly approaching fund managers who were not aligned with management, but who tended to be passive in matters of corporate governance, 189 and would be likely to sell out their holdings in return for a premium. 190 Indeed, the possibility of hostile takeovers was probably one of the main reasons why institutional investors were willing and able to remain passive throughout the period from the 1960s to the 1980s.
Whilst all these factors contributed to the emergence of the hostile takeover after 1948, the contribution of s184 has not received sufficient attention. Hannah rejected the argument that the new power of the majority to remove the directors facilitated the emergence of the hostile takeover on the basis that the Stock Exchange already required listed companies to have a term equivalent to Art 80 of a take-over bidder will obtain control by acquiring these votes has caused directors to pay greater heed to the interests of 192 More recent commentary has begun to focus on the significance of this legal change. In his 2008 historical account of the separation of ownership and control, Cheffins noted that this provision of the Companies Act 193 Bruner notes that the new rule -be acquirers to achieve substantial governance power through open- 194 Moore has gone the furthest in recognising the importance of this right, describing as -institutional factor underlying the centrality of the so-- 195 By changing the thresholds for control of the board, and with it, the management, s184 played a critical role in allowing the hostile takeover to become an established practice, the legitimacy of which was no longer questioned by policy-makers after the mid-1950s. It gradually gained approval, first from commentators, 196 then from the City of London and the minority of that Committee added the further gloss that takeovers were a spur to managerial efficiency. 199 By 1963, the efficiency-enhancing effects of takeovers were beginning to be theorised by economists, 200 and in 1965, Manne introduced the theory of the market for corporate control to the United States. 201 In 1968, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers was introduced, normalising the hostile takeover by precluding directors from taking any action to frustrate bids and removing the uncertainty that surrounded the common law approach to defensive measures. 202 The autonomy of directors and managers had been truncated, and from then on, their primary focus was, of necessity, the interest of shareholders as expressed by the share price.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have argued that, during the first half of the century, companies were residual control. However, the role of management was never really considered by the law, and managers were never given legal guarantees of the autonomy which was required if they were to fulfil the functions claimed for them in the burgeoning management literature.
The 1948 reforms contributed significantly to a reduction of the fragile autonomy of management, and with it, the potential of the enterprise to balance competing interests and to innovate. They disrupted these hierarchical structures (to which the shareholders had impliedly consented) with the introduction of a mandatory statutory rule (highly unusual in the company law context) which allowed the removal of the directors by simple majority, articles. This article has shown that shareholder control represents a regulatory and policy choice rather than a market outcome. This choice was little debated in Parliament, and its instigators fell back on unjustified assumptions that shareholder control was essential. Efficiency-based justifications of company law only came law. Policy-makers are discussing restoring trust in companies through indirect measures such as country-by-country tax reporting, or through stakeholder advisory panels. We would suggest that more fruitful avenues may be found by revisiting the management literature of the first half of the twentieth century, and finding new ways to guarantee autonomy within a framework of accountability.
